For the past decades, quantum computing has occupied a strange space in cybersecurity discourse — somewhere between genuine scientific interest and marketing-fueled doomsaying. We’re told it’s coming to break cryptography and render all our defenses obsolete. And yet, here we are.

Seventeen years after my first contact with quantum computing during my physics degree, we’re still signing our software with RSA, securing web traffic with ECC, and hashing passwords the same way. The predicted cryptographic collapse has yet to arrive — and not for lack of trying. So what gives?

What Quantum Computers Actually Do

Let’s start with some reality: quantum computers are not general-purpose machines. They won’t replace your laptop, run your IDE, or brute-force every password on your system overnight. They’re purpose-built to solve a narrow set of mathematical problems — problems that do include factoring large integers (bad news for RSA), but not, for example, bypassing multi-factor authentication or exploiting zero-days.

The ability to break public-key cryptography stems from one algorithm: Shor’s. It’s brilliant, but it requires a level of quantum scale and error correction that we are still far from achieving. Despite headlines, today’s “quantum computers” remain noisy, limited, and experimental.

Post-Quantum Cryptography Isn’t a Future Concept — It’s a Present Standard

What’s often overlooked is that our response to the theoretical risk has already matured. NIST has completed its selection of quantum-resistant algorithms. Organizations across the public and private sectors are beginning migrations — not in panic, but as part of long-term planning. We don’t need fearmongering; we need implementation roadmaps.

The actual risk isn’t that we won’t have quantum-safe cryptography. It’s that we’ll still be running vulnerable legacy systems when quantum capabilities do become viable. And let’s be clear: that’s a problem we already have with non-quantum threats today.

Beware the Quantum Echo Chamber

There’s also an uncomfortable truth we need to address: some of the loud voices about quantum risk have a vested interest in keeping the threat alive.

“Quantum cybersecurity consultant” is a job title that only exists because of fear about quantum. Many in these roles lack formal training in quantum mechanics or cryptography. Yet their LinkedIn posts and webinars often treat speculation as inevitability and theoretical risk as operational crisis.

That doesn’t mean quantum computing is irrelevant. But we should question the incentives behind any claim that it’s an urgent existential threat. And we should certainly be skeptical when the solution conveniently involves buying a proprietary “quantum-safe” appliance.

What Sensible Preparation Actually Looks Like

If you’re not designing cryptographic protocols, you don’t need to dive into quantum math. What you should be doing is:

• Performing threat modeling: Where in your systems does data need to remain secure for decades? That’s where quantum becomes relevant.
• Staying informed: Understand the roadmap for quantum computing advancements and NIST’s post-quantum standards. No need to follow every paper — just keep up with the milestones.
• Planning migrations: Especially for long-term confidentiality, like government archives, health records, or industrial IP. Start now, move gradually.

This is about posture, not panic.

The Real Bottom Line

Quantum computing deserves respect, not reverence. It’s a fascinating and complex area of research, and it will have an impact — eventually. But framing it as the sword of Damocles hanging over cybersecurity is neither honest nor helpful.

The real work ahead isn’t in reinventing cryptography. It’s in upgrading our infrastructure, deprecating insecure systems, and making sure that when quantum does arrive, we’ve already adapted.

So no, quantum isn’t going to “break security”. But if we let hype cloud our judgment and delay rational planning, we just might break it ourselves.

AI helped me write this article, but the thinking and opinions are all mine.